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ABSTRACT: This essay investigates the phenomenon of “embedded” mental states 
in fiction (i.e., a mental state within a mental state within yet another mental state, as 
in, “Mrs. Banks wished that Mary Poppins wouldn’t know so very much more about 
the best people than she knew herself ”), asking if patterns of embedment manifest 
themselves differently in children’s literature than they do in literature for “grownups.” 
Looking at books for three age groups (nine to twelve, three to seven, and one to two), 
Zunshine finds significant differences in their respective patterns of embedment, while 
also arguing that a critical inquiry into complex mental states is not just a cognitive but 
also a historicist project. Drawing on research in developmental psychology, rhetorical 
narratology, and cultural history, as well as on digital data mining, this essay seeks to 
broaden the interdisciplinary and interpretive range of cognitive literary studies. 
KEYWORDS: children’s literature, narratology, theory of mind, cultural history, Mark 
Twain, Laura Ingalls Wilder
REMEMBER the time when Ben Rogers left off what looked like a really cool game—
pretending to be a Missouri steam ship—to take over Tom Sawyer’s chore of white-
washing the fence?
Tom gave up the brush with reluctance in his face, but alacrity in his heart. 
And while the late steamer Big Missouri worked and sweated in the sun, the 
retired artist sat on a barrel in the shade close by, dangled his legs, munched 
his apple, and planned the slaughter of more innocents. There was no lack 
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of material; boys happened along every little while; they came to jeer, but 
remained to whitewash. (20)
Ben is sweating in the sun, Tom is sitting in the shade, and Twain is having fun 
with a Biblical reference. His twelve-year old Herod will soon “slaughter” more “in-
nocents.” With macabre logic, Twain describes those innocents as things inanimate. 
They merely “happen along,” as a “material” on which “the retired artist” can work at 
leisure, dangling his legs and munching an apple.
What underlies these ironic twists—that is, the reason that we understand why 
the boys are described as being massacred and manipulated—is a series of psycholog-
ical insights developed by Twain’s protagonist. Tom doesn’t want his friends to realize 
that he hates whitewashing the fence. He discovers that if he makes them think that 
he enjoys it, they’ll see it as play instead of work and even pay him for the privilege of 
doing his chore.
Take another look at those insights. Each of them is structured as a mental state 
within a mental state within yet another mental state: Tom doesn’t want his friends to 
realize that he hates whitewashing the fence; he wants them to think that he enjoys it. 
Granted, these are my formulations, but if you try to come up with one of your own, 
you may discover that, if you want to capture the complexity of the social situation 
conjured up by Twain, simpler descriptions of mental functioning, such as, “he wants 
them to do his work for him” or “they think that he likes painting the fence” won’t do. 
In fact, they’ll misrepresent what’s going on, until you find a way to connect them, 
through another thought or intention. It seems, in other words, that, however you 
choose to phrase it, you’ll need to recursively embed mental states on at least the third 
level.
The term “mental state” comes from cognitive science, where it’s often used 
to describe functioning of theory of mind, a.k.a. mindreading, that is, our tendency 
to see behavior as caused by mental states, such as thoughts, desires, feelings, and 
intentions.1 To understand the concept of “embedded” mental states, compare the four 
following statements. “My last name begins with Z” contains no mental states, embed-
ded or otherwise. “I’m glad that my last name begins with Z because the teacher may 
not get to the end of the list today” contains just one mental state: me being happy 
about being at the end of the class list. “I am afraid that the teacher will remember 
that she hasn’t called on me for a while” contains two embedded mental states; while 
“I wonder if the teacher realizes that I’m hoping that she won’t call on me today be-
cause my last name begins with Z, and will thus on purpose start at the end of the 
list” contains three embedded mental states: me thinking about the teacher’s thinking 
about my thinking.
Our routine social interactions may involve mental states embedded on high lev-
els, such as third or fourth,2 yet many of them probably don’t require such complex 
embedments. For instance, I see my son pulling out a box of pencils, and I assume 
(without necessarily being consciously aware of it) that he intends to draw; I see my 
neighbor coming out of his house and strolling toward his car, and I assume that he 
wants to go somewhere. According to cognitive psychologist Patricia Miller, think-
ing about thinking about thinking (third-level embedment) “occurs in interpersonal 
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cognition in real life less frequently” than, for instance, thinking about thinking (sec-
ond-level embedment). The former, as she puts it, “has a lower ecological plausibility” 
(622).
Hence an important difference between our daily mindreading and our experi-
ence of reading fiction as well as some literary nonfiction: As I have argued elsewhere,3 
fiction embeds complex mental states at a much greater frequency than happens ei-
ther in our daily life or in expository nonfiction.4 To make sense of what’s going on 
in plays, novels, narrative poems, as well as in memoirs concerned with imagination 
and consciousness, we constantly embed mental states on at least the third level. The 
key word here is constantly, for I don’t think that either literary critics or lay readers 
appreciate the true scale of this phenomenon. To put it starkly, fiction, as we know it 
today, cannot function on lower than the third level of embedment—unlike exposi-
tory nonfiction, which may contain occasional forays into the third level, but can also 
subsist, quite happily, on just the first and second level.
Embedded mental states can belong to characters, narrators, (implied) authors, 
and (implied) readers, in a vast variety of combinations.5 In “Tom wants his friends to 
think that he enjoys his chore,” the third-level embedment involves the novel’s char-
acters. But at the same time yet another complex embedment arises from an intricate 
give and take between the implied author and his audience. The implied author ex-
pects that his readers will appreciate his mischievous intention, as he likens Tom, in the 
same breath, to King Herod and to a retired artist. Again, this is my formulation, but 
if you try to explain how this passage achieves its ironic effect, you are likely to find 
yourself speculating about how the author might have been intuitively anticipating 
his readers’ thinking.
It would be wrong to assume, however, that we factor mental states of the implied 
author and reader into any complex embedment. Of course, we can say, “the implied 
author wants us to know that Tom wants his friends to think that he enjoys his chore,” 
and call it a case of fifth-level embedment instead of third, but those extra levels will 
be redundant because they don’t contribute anything to our understanding of the 
passage. In contrast, the references to King Herod and a retired artist are the kind of 
“communicative event” (Phelan and Rabinowitz 37) that necessitates a recognition of 
a particularly oriented intentionality behind it.
We don’t usually articulate this to ourselves the way I just did. Indeed, in spite of 
the language that I use to describe it—such as “we recognize,” “we are aware,” or “the 
implied author wants us to know”—most of it doesn’t rise to the level of conscious 
awareness. Nevertheless, something in us must keep track of those complex intention-
alities, because, otherwise, how would we explain to ourselves, say, Twain’s evocation 
of the Massacre of Innocents in a scene that had nothing to do with infanticide?
Most embedded mental states that I have discussed so far are implied, that is, 
readers themselves must deduce them to make sense of the story. But mental states 
can also be explicitly spelled out by the text. For instance, when Aunt Polly punish-
es Tom for breaking a sugar-bowl and then finds out that it was Sid who broke it, 
she can’t bring herself to confess that she has been in the wrong—for “discipline for-
bade that”—and goes “about her affairs with a troubled heart,” while Tom, perfectly 
aware of her remorse, is relishing it. He knows that his aunt wants him to forgive 
4  Lisa Zunshine
her (third-level embedment), and he enjoys knowing that she wants him to forgive 
her (fourth-level). Or, as Twain puts it: “He knew that in her heart his aunt was on 
her knees to him, and he was morosely gratified by the consciousness of it” (25; my 
emphases).
What is crucial about these third-and-fourth-level embedments is that they do 
not just occasionally happen along. Instead, any given paragraph contains multiple 
complex embedments, sometimes implied, sometimes explicitly spelled out, often a 
combination of the two. As I am writing this and leafing through Tom Sawyer, I reach 
almost at random for a complex embedment here and a complex embedment there, 
but, in pretty much every case, I can turn to a group of sentences preceding or follow-
ing any passage that I will have just quoted for you, and it will contain another implied 
or explicitly spelled-out complex embedment.
Complex embedments alone may not be a sufficient condition for fictionality. 
After all, literary nonfiction can have those as well. Still, it is significant that they are 
already there in the earliest surviving works of literature, such as The Epic of Gilgamesh 
(2000 BC),6 even if the frequency of their appearance in the ancient epics is not yet 
comparable to what we start seeing later, for instance, in ninth-century Chinese tales 
of romance (such as “Ying-ying’s Story”), in the eleventh-century Japanese novel, in 
the Restoration comedy, or in the eighteenth-century English novel. Today, we won’t 
be amiss if we think of continuous complex embedment as yet another mark of what 
Roman Jacobson called the “literariness” of fiction, that is, a feature that makes fiction 
different from other discourses.
What does it mean to think of complex embedment of mental states as an es-
sential feature of fiction?7 It means thinking on three historical levels simultaneously, 
being aware of the “deep” (i.e., evolutionary) history of our species, of the more imme-
diate cultural history of specific communities, and of literary history.
The “deep” history explains why we have an abiding interest in intentions. Theory 
of mind was evolution’s “quick and dirty contrivance”8 which helped our species to 
navigate its social environment hundreds of thousands years ago, and it stuck, in spite 
of its imperfections. As a result, today we may be particularly disposed to consume 
and seek out imaginary contexts shot through with mental states.
At the same time, as anthropologist Webb Keane observes, while “theory of 
mind and intention-seeking are common to all humans,” they are “elaborated in some 
communities [and] suppressed in others” (131). While I don’t want to make (indeed, 
would disagree with) any grand pronouncements about what kind of fictional narra-
tives can or cannot thrive in a community in which capacities for mindreading are 
“played down,” I think we can safely assume that communities in which mindreading 
capacities are “emphasized” offer their members different contexts for representing 
various shades and hues of intentionality.
Thinking about these contexts—let us call them genres—brings us to literary his-
tory. Genres have developmental trajectories of their own, which may result in the ap-
pearance of narratives that construct particularly intricate representations of thoughts 
and feelings as well as those that seem to have nothing to do with mental states and, 
in fact, come across as preventing readers from contemplating mental states. Having 
discussed such “anti-mindreading” narratives elsewhere,9 I will give you here just one 
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example of their effect on readers. David Richter observes that his undergraduates 
at Queens College, CUNY, redouble their efforts to read complex intentionality into 
works of fiction that make it difficult for them to do that, such as, for instance, Alain 
Robbe-Grillet’s novel Jealousy. As Richter reports, “My students read the repeated 
narrative about the centipede that horrifies A. . . . and is killed by Franck as coming 
from a (jealously obsessive) narrator noticing and recalling over and over Franck’s 
responsiveness to A. . . . They even read the chapter in which we are told about how 
many banana trees are in each row in each segment of the plantation as coming from 
a mind that was forcing itself to pay  attention to objective facts about his banana 
plantation in an attempt to stop himself from obsessively thinking about his wife A 
. . . and her possible relation to Franck.”10
Keep in mind our mid-level historical perspective when you think about those 
students’ reaction. They live in a culture that emphasizes mindreading and even 
has institutional settings, such as college courses, which reward their participants 
for speaking and writing about intentionality. This means that they learn early on 
to approach texts marked as fiction with the expectation of mindreading, and of a 
particularly elaborate kind at that, if they happen to encounter those texts in a college 
literature course.
As a corollary to Richter’s experience with Jealousy, consider a recent study by 
Chris Gavaler and Dan Johnson, who have shown that, when faced with a text that is 
a priori judged as “having lower literary merit” (86), such as science fiction, readers 
tend to “exert less inference effort” (91) in situations that require supplying mentalis-
tic explanations of characters’ behavior. Ironically, by missing implied mental states, 
these readers confirm their initial biased view of some genres or settings as less con-
ducive to the experience of literariness.
Literariness brought about by the continuous complex embedment of mental 
states is thus simultaneously a cognitive, a cultural, and a textual phenomenon. It is 
rooted in theory of mind, fostered by specific mind-reading communities, and instan-
tiated by stylistic means unique to particular texts. When I map levels of embedment 
in fiction, I focus primarily on those stylistic means. This is not surprising. Style, after 
all, brings in mental states.11 Still, I want you to remember that our conversation about 
mental states happens in a culture that encourages and (mostly) rewards these kinds 
of inquiries, and that our social fabric is comprised of expectations, assumptions, eth-
ical affordances, and institutional contexts which sharpen our interest in intentions. 
In other words, I may talk about embedments as if they were “in” the text, but in 
reality they are distributed across culture and depend on communities socialized to 
particular forms of mindreading.
While my main reference point, here and elsewhere, is literary fiction, it should 
not be taken as an indication that genre fiction, such as fantasy, romance, or, indeed, 
science fiction, does not also depend on complex embedment of mental states. It does. 
The main difference between the two may be that the more formulaic works of fiction 
tend to embed mental states of characters and spell them out explicitly, while liter-
ary fiction embeds mental states of implied readers, writers, and narrators, as well 
as characters, and makes the reader infer implied mental states in addition to (and 
sometimes instead of) spelling some out.12
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This claim, however, is only useful when qualified. As Gavaler and Johnson 
demonstrated, approaching a work of fiction with a category in mind impacts our 
mindreading effort allocation.13 This means that when we talk about the difference 
between complex embedment of mental states in literary and genre fiction, we would 
do well to consider a previously unencountered text on its own merits rather than as a 
member of a category. That is, we may want to start out by looking at its embedment 
pattern, instead of expecting to see a certain pattern based on its genre affiliation.
Given that embedded mental states in fiction have been on the radar of students 
of literature for several years,14 we already have some idea of what reading “for” them 
may entail. For instance, a recent collaborative study by Douglas H. Whalen et al., 
involving cognitive scientists and literary scholars, has demonstrated that subjects can 
be trained to judge levels of embedment quite quickly, and that while their judgments 
tend to display a “sizable agreement” (2016, 292), their disagreements open up new 
venues for literary analysis. Nevertheless, we are still at the early stages of grasping the 
full significance of patterns of embedment for different genres, media, and historical 
settings.
What makes this line of inquiry particularly challenging is that its underlying 
theoretical foundations are a moving target. For, on the one hand, one is encouraged 
by the compatibility between what we are learning about embedment and a broad 
range of paradigms from our own discipline, ranging from Bakhtinian dialogism 
(Zunshine, “Bakhtin, Theory of Mind”) and Speech Act Theory (Rabinowitz and Ban-
croft) to narratology (Rabinowitz), studies in law and ethics (Lee), and mimetic imag-
ination (Cave). On the other hand, to the extent to which cognitive literary critics 
working with embedment draw on research in cognitive science, they have to contend 
with the provisional state of their assumptions about underlying cognitive processes 
and be prepared not just to revise their earlier views but also to admit that they may 
not yet have a clear understanding of what’s going on.
My goal here is to show how insights about patterns of embedment in fiction can 
be expanded to a new domain: children’s literature. Some aspects of my argument 
are indeed provisional, for its cognitive foundations are being adjusted even as I am 
writing, with cognitive psychologists revising their earlier assumptions about discrete 
stages of theory of mind development in children. I begin with a review of this re-
search, followed by a preliminary assessment of patterns of embedment in stories for 
children aged 9–12, 3–7, and 1–2. These age groupings are taken from the most recent 
editions of Freeman’s, Gillespie’s, and Lipson’s guides to children’s books and cross-
checked with scholastic.com.15
I chose Tom Sawyer as an entry point into this conversation because of its histori-
cally ambiguous status as a book for children, ambiguity that may have been informed 
by readers’ intuitive awareness of its patterns of embedment. As I move from Twain’s 
novel to contemporary books for young readers, I explore the productive tension be-
tween such intuitions and the historicity of our assumptions about what constitutes 
a work of fiction written for children. Cognitive historicism16 has already made sig-
nificant inroads in early modern and nineteenth-century studies.17 With this essay, I 
hope to introduce this approach into the thriving field of children’s literature studies, 
particularly given its practitioners’ growing interest in cognitive science.18
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Review of Research in Developmental Psychology
At what age do we start embedding complex mental states in our daily social life and 
thus, presumably, become receptive to narratives featuring such embedments? Until 
recently, psychologists thought that children begin to appreciate false beliefs—that 
is, realize that people may believe something that is not, in fact, true—around the 
age of 4.19 Then, between 5 and 7, children become attuned to “doubly embedded” 
representations, that is, they become aware “not just that people have beliefs (and false 
beliefs) about the world, but that they also have beliefs about the content of others’ 
minds (i.e., about others’ beliefs), and similarly, these too may be different or wrong” 
(Astington et al. 133).20
The traditional view that before the age of 4 children are not ready to attribute 
false beliefs to others was challenged in 2005 by Kristine Onishi and Renée Baillar-
geon, who showed that 15-months-old infants may already understand false beliefs. 
Since then, numerous other studies have pushed the age for such understanding even 
lower. 21 To complicate matters further, “developmental research emphasizes that [the-
ory of mind] has several components” (Mumper and Gerrig), hence it’s not always 
clear which component, at its particular stage of maturation, is affecting a given out-
come. While different theories have been proposed to account for the “puzzle of theo-
ry of mind” in infants,22 for the purposes of my argument I will settle on the view that 
“the infant mindreading system develops gradually, transforming into the adult one 
through incremental learning and piecemeal conceptual change” (Carruthers 159). 
The changes that take place around the ages of 4, 5, and 7 may still represent import-
ant milestones in theory-of-mind development, but they can now be understood as 
steps in a continuous integrated process rather than dramatic breakthroughs.
Embedded mindreading assumes new prominence as children enter adolescence. 
As Miller et al. ruefully observe in their essay, “Thinking about People Thinking 
about People Thinking about . .  .  ,” “often to their pain, adolescents are much more 
gifted” at “wondering what he thinks of me” and “what he thinks I think of him” 
than “first graders are” (623). The drama of alliance-building and sexual maturation 
is inseparable from reading and, inevitably, misreading of one’s own and others’ em-
bedded intentions.
Although cognitive scientists have looked at the frequency and types of mental 
states in children’s stories, they have not looked specifically at embedment. Thus Jen-
nifer Dyer et al. used a sample of ninety books to see if “the information about mental 
states” present in children’s storybooks differed in books for younger preschoolers 
(3–4 year olds) and older preschoolers (5–6 year olds), “either in quantity or kind” 
(19). What they found was that “mental state information in storybooks for young 
children” doesn’t simply increase “with the children’s sophistication from 3 [to] 6 
years of age”; instead, books for younger and older children are “notably similar in 
the rates of types and tokens of mental state expressions and the richness of mental 
state concepts, particularly those expressed by cognitive state terms and situational 
irony.” Yet, at the same time, books for older children contain “more mental state 
terms [and] more varied mental state vocabulary.” Additionally, more of the books for 
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older children feature a “variety of references from more of the different categories of 
mental state.” (34)
The textual dynamic described by this study as “situational irony” comes close to 
what I call “implied embedment.” Dyer et al. use this expression to refer to moments 
when readers are aware of, say, a disjunction between two characters’ perspectives, 
even if it is never explicitly spelled out. Observe, however, the difference between 
the two terms. “Situational irony” is relatively abstract, while “implied embedment” 
calls for an articulation of the relationship among the minds involved, which, in turn, 
allows us to calculate the level of embedment, as in, “the reader is aware that character 
A doesn’t know what character B is thinking” (third level).
Authors of another study, Joan Peskin and Janet Astington, wanted to see if in-
creased exposure of preschoolers to explicit references to mental states would result 
“in a greater conceptual understanding of one’s own and other people’s beliefs” (254). 
What they found was that hearing such “terms in stories is less important than having 
to actively construct one’s own mentalistic interpretations from illustrations and text 
that implicitly draw attention to mental states” (253). Moreover, leaving preschoolers 
aside for a moment, Peskin and Astington contend that works of fiction routinely 
force their readers to do just that, that is, to construct their “own mentalistic inter-
pretations” of the action: “Dramatic tension in stories is created when the various 
characters have disparate knowledge with regard to the action. This may be through 
error: The reader knows that Romeo does not know that Juliet lies drugged, not dead. 
Or it may be through deception: Pretending his assigned chore is an adventure, Tom 
Sawyer tricks his friends into whitewashing the fence” (267).
What Peskin and Astington call “disparate knowledge with regard to action” is 
similar to Dyer’s “situational irony.” Once again, we come close to the concept of “im-
plied embedment,” particularly with Peskin and Astington’s emphasis on texts “that 
implicitly draw attention to mental states.” Let us see, however, if we can go further 
than simply recognizing some moments in fiction—in this case, fiction for children—
as instances of dramatic irony (or “situational irony,” or “disparate knowledge in re-
gard to action”) if we inquire more minutely into the configuration of mental states 
involved.
Age 9–12
Among the books recommended for children aged 9–12 are Twain’s Tom Sawyer, 
Frances Hodgson Burnett’s The Secret Garden, A. A. Milne’s Winnie the Pooh, Laura 
Ingalls Wilder’s Little House in the Big Woods, Tove Jansson’s graphic novel Moomin 
Falls in Love, Jeff Kinney’s “Diary of a Wimpy Kid” series, Lewis Carroll’s Alice in 
Wonderland, P. L. Travers’s Mary Poppins, and E. B. White’s Stuart Little. I list below 
some examples of third-level embedment more or less in their order of appearance 
in these stories, leaving out for now Tom Sawyer and Little House in the Big Woods.
We learn in the first paragraph of The Secret Garden that when Mary was born, 
her nurse was made to understand that if she wanted to please her mistress, she should 
keep the child to herself. As the narrator explains, Mary’s mother “had not wanted a 
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little girl at all, and when Mary was born she handed her over to the care of an Ayah, 
who was made to understand that if she wished to please the Mem Sahib she must 
keep the child out of sight as much as possible” (1). When Mary’s mother dies and 
the little girl is shipped to England, she meets Mrs. Medlock, the housekeeper of her 
new guardian. Mary dislikes her and tries walking further away from her because 
she hates to think that people would assume that she belongs to her: “It would have 
made her angry to think people imagined she was her little girl.” When Mrs. Medlock 
tells her about her new home, Mary listens “in spite of herself,” but she doesn’t want 
Mrs. Medlock to think that she is interested: she “did not intend to look as if she were 
interested” (6).
In the first chapter of Winnie the Pooh, Pooh, in his quest for honey, floats up to 
a bees’ nest on his balloon and hopes that the bees will think that he is a small black 
cloud in the sky. But the honey is still out of reach, and, moreover, he worries that the 
bees suspect something. So he asks Christopher Robin for help:
“Christopher Robin!” “Yes?” “Have you an umbrella in your house?” “I think 
so.” “I wish you would bring it out here, and walk up and down with it, and 
look up at me every now and then, and say ‘Tut-tut, it looks like rain.’ I think, 
if you did that it would help the deception which we are practising on these 
bees.” Well, you laughed to yourself, ‘Silly old Bear!’ but you didn’t say it 
out loud because you were so fond of him, and you went home for your 
umbrella. (14).
Short as it is, this passage contains several complex embedments: Pooh doesn’t want 
the bees to know that he wants to steal their honey; Christopher Robin doesn’t want 
Pooh to know that he thinks his plan won’t work; the narrator knows that Christopher 
Robin doesn’t want to hurt Pooh’s feelings.
In Diary of a Wimpy Kid: Rodrick Rules, the main protagonist, Greg, observes his 
parents “acting all lovey in front of [their youngest son] Manny” (15), because they 
don’t want Manny to think that their arguments mean that they don’t love each other. 
(Does the implied author want his grownup readers to cringe in recognition as they 
think of the times when they hoped to manipulate their own kids the same way? I 
leave it up to you to decide if this particular embedment is part of our “mentalistic 
interpretation” of the action.) On another occasion, Greg reports thinking about his 
father’s feelings about Greg’s older brother’s intentions: “I’m pretty sure Dad’s worst 
fear is that . . . Rodrick will want to follow in Bill’s footsteps” (35).
In Moomin Falls in Love, Moomintroll develops a crush on a circus performer, 
La Goona. His girlfriend, Snorkmaiden, is heartbroken and lonely. As she confides 
to Mymble, “If you only knew how I have longed for a friend’s understanding and 
advice” (17). Mymble suggests pretending that she doesn’t care for Moomin anymore, 
but when Snorkmaiden follows her suggestion, she’s bitterly disappointed because 
Moomin’s only too happy to learn that he can do anything he wants (18). Moreover, 
it transpires that La Goona fancies a circus acrobat who can lift big stones. Moomin 
tries to wrench a heavy boulder out of the ground and fails. Little My, who observes 
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his effort, tells him, “I guess you must think of an entirely different way of impressing 
La Goona” (19; my emphases throughout).
In Alice in Wonderland, Alice “[thinks that she] can remember feeling a little dif-
ferent” (29). In Mary Poppins, Mrs. Banks wishes that Mary Poppins wouldn’t “know 
so very much more about the best people” than she knows herself (26). (This is an 
explicitly spelled-out embedment, but an equally interesting implied one is lurking 
just beneath the surface, involving a grownup reader’s awareness of Mary Poppins’s 
manipulation of her class-conscious employer.) Furthermore, Jane and Michael can’t 
figure out if Mary Poppins only pretends to get angry at them and not understand what 
they mean when they say that her Uncle likes “rolling and bobbing on the ceiling” 
(56); and Jane “wonder[s] if she would ever be able to remember what Mrs. Corry 
remembered” (133; my emphases throughout).
In Stuart Little, we learn that Stuart’s father, “Mr. Little, was not at all sure that he 
understood Stuart’s real feelings about a mousehole” (11). Later on, the family cat wants 
everyone to think that Stuart ran down the mousehole while he’s actually trapped in 
a window shade. Stuart knows what the cat had in mind, yet when he is finally found 
and rescued, he decides not to tell on the cat. Instead, he wants his family to “draw 
[their] own conclusions” about who might have wanted them to think that he would 
run down the mousehole, and why (25; my emphases throughout).
It appears that in spite of obvious differences in their subject matter, the pattern 
of embedment that one encounters in books for this age group is similar to the one 
encountered in fiction for “grownups.” Both feature complex (that is, at least third-lev-
el) embedments of mental states, which are either implied or explicitly spelled out and 
associated with characters, narrators, readers, and authors.
One important difference—at least in this sample—seems to have to do with the 
frequency of complex embedments. In story after story, from Alice in Wonderland to 
Stuart Little, I had to actively search for third-level embedments, sometimes coming 
up empty for a whole page. This situation would be difficult to imagine in literary 
fiction for grownups, in which the main effort required to find an instance of complex 
embedment involves opening the book. (There, even when descriptions of mental 
states are intentionally omitted, to make it seem that characters lack what we may call 
interiority, embedded mental states are still implied.23)
Let me complicate this narrative of difference, if only up to a point. Books in this 
age bracket (9–12) are sometimes characterized by what Ulrich Knoepflmacher and 
Mitzi Myers call “cross-writing.” That is, they activate a dialogue “between phases of 
life we persist in regarding as opposites,” appealing in different ways to young and 
adult readers (viii). And I don’t just mean implied embedments, as when adult read-
ers are aware of Travers’s intention to show that Mary Poppins knows how to tacitly 
exploit Mrs. Banks’s class anxieties. I also mean subtle interactions between the author 
and the reader which arise from the parodic feel of the text. As Sandra Beckett ob-
serves, to “appreciate parody [of, for instance, Carroll’s Alice books] the reader must 
first recognize the intent to parody another work and then have the ability to identify 
the appropriated work and interpret its meaning in the new context.” (175) This rec-
ognition of intent is already a complex embedment—I realize that the author wants 
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me to think of text A as I am reading text B—even before we factor in mental states of 
characters whose motivations we may have to interpret in light of this “new context.”
What does a reader’s potential awareness of an author’s intent do to my present 
argument about a somewhat less frequent incidence of complex embedment in fiction 
for children aged 9–12 as compared to fiction for adults? Should we say that at least 
in some of these books, the frequency of complex embedments may approach that 
encountered in books for grownups, but only for those readers who “possess all of the 
codes necessary to understand all of the parodic allusions” (Beckett 176)? A version of 
this argument—which is that there are always more embedments in a text than meet 
a casual eye—can be made about many works of literature; for, experienced readers 
bring to them the “mastery of the codes of fiction”24 which enables them to be more 
attuned to various forms of intentionality present in the text than less experienced 
readers may be. This effect seems to be indirectly borne out by the research of psy-
chologists who suggest that “less experienced readers [find] literary characters a bit 
more clear than the more experienced readers” (Kidd and Castano), which may mean 
that long-term exposure to literary fiction makes one more prone to look for complex 
intentionality and less willing to settle for unambiguous explanations of characters’ 
motivations.
History and Cognition: Case Study One (Tom Sawyer)
This is the point at which we revisit Twain’s novel. Although it is typically placed on 
the same reading level as Mary Poppins, Alice in Wonderland, and Stuart Little, its 
pattern of embedment differs from that prevalent in those books. That is, even if we 
take into account their cross-writing tendencies and say that an experienced/adult 
reader intuits more intentionality in them than does a less experienced/child reader, 
they still do not live up to the furious rate with which complex embedments (espe-
cially implied ones, involving the narrator and the implied reader) present themselves 
in Tom Sawyer. When it comes to the frequency of such embedments, Twain’s novel 
is on par with unambiguously “grownup” texts which have hitherto been studied by 
cognitive literary critics working with embedment (e.g., novels by Murasaki Shikibu, 
Cao Xueqin, Frances Burney, Jane Austen, Lev Tolstoy, E. M. Forster, Thomas Mann, 
Edith Wharton, and Zadie Smith).
Why, then, is Tom Sawyer considered to be a book for children? Several factors 
seemed to have made it so. First, as Beverly Lyon Clark has shown in her study of cul-
tural construction of children’s literature, Twain “himself notoriously vacillated about 
the intended audience for what are now sometimes called his boy books” (80). In July 
1875, he wrote to William Dean Howells that Tom Sawyer was “not a boy’s book at 
all,” that it was “only written for adults” and would “only be read by adults” (Clemens 
and Howells 91). When Howells suggested that it should rather be (to use our present 
term) a cross-writing novel, Twain responded by “toning down [its] satire and strong 
language” (Clark 80). In January 1876, he was able to assure Howells that Tom Saywer 
was now “for boys and girls” (Clemens and Howells 122). In the preface to the pub-
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lished novel, he evokes both audiences, hoping that, though “intended mainly for the 
entertainment of boys and girls, . . . it will not be shunned by men and women on that 
account” (3).
And nineteenth-century men and women did not shun Tom Sawyer. It was said 
to “appeal to all ages,” reflecting, among other things, a perspective of a culture “in 
which the [grownup and children] audiences were not yet fully discrete” (Clark 84, 
81). In that culture, a review of books entitled “For the Young” could still appear in the 
Atlantic (a practice apparently discontinued after 1903), stating that, although a child 
“will devour tales like Tom Sawyer or Huckleberry Finn,  .  . he cannot understand 
their real merit. . . . The adult intelligence is necessary to understand them” (quoted 
in Clark 89).
But although both “tales” were initially thought to demand the “adult intelli-
gence,” that perception did not last. Over the course of the twentieth century, Huck-
leberry Finn was gradually elevated to the “great American novel,” an elevation which 
depended, Clark argues, on the simultaneous relegation of Tom Sawyer to “kiddie 
lit.” As she puts it, the construction of Huckleberry Finn’s greatness “at the expense of 
Tom Sawyer” entailed erosion “of a fundamental respect for childhood and children’s 
literature” (101). While largely agreeing with her account, I want to add in a cognitive 
factor, by taking a closer look at the difference between the two novels’ pattern of 
embedment and showing how it may have made easier (if not necessarily determined) 
the elevation of one book at the expense of the other.
I take as my starting point James Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz’s contrast between 
the respective implied authors of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn. As they put it, 
Twain of Tom Sawyer speaks in the “avuncular” voice—“one that sold well in the 
public marketplace” but that may have demanded less work from his readers than 
the voice behind Huckleberry Finn, which is characterized by a “multilayered” (163) 
ethical consciousness. Thus in one of the passages used by Phelan and Rabinowitz to 
illustrate their point,
Huck describes the widow Douglas’s response to his return to her home this 
way: ‘The widow she cried over me, and called me a poor lost lamb, and she 
called me a lot of other names, too, but she never meant no harm by it.’ . . . 
Huck misinterprets the widow’s joyous religious references as name-calling 
because he doesn’t recognize the New Testament source—and that misin-
terpreting leads him to undervalue the ethical quality of her response. Yet 
this comic failure of understanding simultaneously reveals a moral strength. 
Although Huck’s ignorance means that he fails to grasp both the extent of 
the widow’s joy and her beliefs about what his return means, Twain demon-
strates that Huck’s ethical compass is sufficiently sensitive for him to appre-
ciate that she ‘never meant no harm.’ . . . The overall effects are to bring us 
affectively and ethically closer to Huck even as we continue to register our 
interpretive difference from him. (35)
There are multiple third-and fourth-level embedments at work here. To spell out 
just a few of them, the implied author wants us to know that Huck doesn’t understand 
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the widow’s motivations (i.e., he “undervalues the ethical quality of her response”). At 
the same time, he wants us to know that Huck understands the widow’s kind inten-
tions. Crucially, it seems that to experience the full rhetorical and emotional impact 
of the passage—which brings us “closer to Huck even as we . . . register our interpre-
tive difference from him”—we have to process both of these complex embedments 
simultaneously.
I actually don’t know what this kind of dual ethical processing entails in terms of 
mindreading. I strongly believe that it does not simply ratchet up the overall level of 
embedment, adding up, say, to the seventh or eighth level. Still, something peculiar is 
happening here, something that cognitive scientists who study complex embedments 
in laboratory and in real-life social interactions don’t tend to encounter.25 At the very 
least it shows that, while remaining inextricably bound with the social, literature has 
run away with it, “having amassed a repertoire of extremely nuanced stylistic tools for 
embedding mental states,”26 as well as having cultivated cultural niches in which the 
capacity for this kind of somewhat “ecologically implausible” mindreading is prized 
and rewarded.
This is not to say that Tom Sawyer never once demands such dual ethical process-
ing from our theory of mind, but that such demands are more frequent in Huckleberry 
Finn and central to the development of its main character, that is, to “the wisdom and 
understanding [Huck gains] during the trip down the River” (163). Huck’s reaction 
to the widow’s response comes early and, as Phelan and Rabinowitz put it, is a “fairly 
simple” case of the split ethical evaluation. The “same kind of interplay,” only “with 
more subtlety and greater consequences,” will mark Huck’s “self-examination” later, 
when he decides “to go to hell rather than inform” the owner of Jim (i.e., the runaway 
slave and Huck’s friend) of Jim’s whereabouts (35).
In fact, so integral is this pattern of “multilayered communication” with the reader 
to the voice of this novel that when at one point (i.e., when Tom plots to arrange Jim’s 
escape from Silas Phelps), Twain abandons it, lapsing into the broad humor familiar 
to the readers of Tom Saywer, the change feels like “a serious come-down” (163). The 
story still gets told through a series of complex embedments—what with all the lies 
that Tom is feeding the Phelpses and with the implied author winking to the reader as 
he parodies the chivalric romance—but the dual ethical processing is notably absent.
Where does it all leave us in the conversation about the twentieth-century desig-
nation of Tom Sawyer as “kiddie lit”? Looking at the dual ethical processing expected 
from readers of Huckleberry Finn—which marks some of its third- and fourth-level 
embedments as qualitatively different from the third- and fourth-level embedments 
in Tom Sawyer—we may speculate that had Twain never written Huckleberry Finn, 
the frequency of such embedments in Tom Sawyer would have made its relegation 
to children’s literature less certain. But with Huckleberry Finn next to it, the intuitive 
awareness of a different kind of sociocognitive complexity underlying the latter’s af-
fective charge may have contributed to this cultural phenomenon.
Still, the main payoff of factoring the cognitive perspective into the historicist 
explanation of this process offered by Clark may be a more nuanced understanding 
of why the designation of Tom Sawyer as “kiddie lit” remains troubling enough for 
critics to keep wanting to account for it. The cascading frequency of complex em-
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bedments expected from the reader of Tom Sawyer—a frequency that, though not 
inconceivable in a book for children,27 is nevertheless rare—may be the reason why 
this novel does not stay meekly put in the category of kiddie lit. For as long as we place 
in that category texts that embed complex mental states of characters, narrators, and 
implied readers, but not at the same high rate that we’ve come to expect from a work 
of “grown-up” literature, Tom Sawyer shall remain an outlier.
History and Cognition: Case Study Two
(Little House in the Big Woods)
Tom Sawyer is not the only outlier that I found in the 9–12 age group. An even more 
striking case, though for the opposite reason, is Ingalls Wilder’s Little House in the 
Big Woods. It contains very few embedded mental states and practically no third-lev-
el embedments. Though a highly compelling narrative in its own right, it has, as its 
readers observe, “no plot.”28 Instead, we learn details of life on the frontier: how bullets 
were made, how butter was churned, and how meat was cured. The near-total absence 
of social situations that would call for attribution of complex mental states is, one 
can safely say, extremely unusual for a text considered to be a novel. To see how this 
classification came to pass, we have to inquire, once again, into the circumstances of 
its writing and publication.
The original version of the “Little House” series was called Pioneer Girl. It was an 
autobiographical account of Wilder’s “family pioneering experiences in the American 
West,” intended for adults. As Wilder’s biographer, Pamela Smith Hill, puts it, it was 
“nonfiction, the truth . . . as only Wilder remembered it” (xvi).
What happened then was that Pioneer Girl could not find a publisher. A typical 
rejection, from Country Home magazine, praised it for “some very interesting pioneer 
reminiscences,” yet explained that they had “no place for non-fiction serials” (quoted 
in Smith xliii). With the assistance of her daughter, established writer Rose Wilder 
Lane, Wilder then turned her autobiographical manuscript into a book of fiction for 
children. As Smith puts it:
Lane not only switched audiences, she switched genres—from nonfiction to 
fiction. When she replaced Wilder’s intimate first-person voice, her ‘I’ narra-
tor, with a third-person narrative, the juvenile manuscript instantly became 
fiction. (xxxvi)
Did it? If we think of fiction in a broader sense of the term, as something fabricat-
ed rather than factual, we can say that Wilder’s manuscript “became fiction” even ear-
lier, when, for instance, to make Pioneer Girl more dramatic, Lane adjusted the timing 
of the Ingallses’ move to Wisconsin to bring them into contact with a notorious family 
of Kansas mass murderers (Smith xxx). Or we can say that the fictional status of the 
Little House books was clinched when, as staunch opponents of the New Deal, Wilder 
and Lane took “serious liberties with the facts of the Ingallses’ lives” to portray the 
U. S. government as “nothing but destructive to the enterprising individual.” Or that 
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it happened when they “entirely made up or altered in fundamental ways” scenes that 
testified to Laura and her sisters’ schooling “in emotional and physical stoicism” (Fell-
man 6–7, 106) and to their family’s socioeconomic self-reliance. As far as historical 
accuracy goes, the series is certainly fiction: a heady blend of ideology and emotional 
warmth, mythologizing life on the frontier.
Yet we have also come to intuitively expect something else from fiction, particu-
larly with the novel as its flagship genre. While the presence of complex embedments 
alone does not determine if a given text is considered fiction, the near-absence of such 
embedments in Little House in the Big Woods makes one wonder just how those joint 
appellations—that of fiction and that of novel—came to stick. To see how it happened, 
we retrain our attention on its cultural reception.
And what we learn when we look at the history of that reception is that readers 
have always seen Little House in the Big Woods in the context of other books in the 
series, which are more “novelistic” in their outlook. For, as Wilder continued to draw 
on Pioneer Girl for her subsequent volumes, she went further than merely substituting 
“I” with “Laura.” As Smith observes:
[As] Wilder transformed her original material into fiction for young read-
ers, she grew both as a writer and ultimately as an artist, creating dynamic 
characters, building more suspenseful stories, and manipulating her themes 
more masterfully. (lv)
From a cognitive literary perspective, we can see the evidence of this transfor-
mation in a gradual increase of the number of situations calling for third-level em-
bedment. Take Little Town on the Prairie, “the best-selling of the Little House books,” 
which serves for many readers as the gateway into the series. It turns out to owe very 
little to the original manuscript: the “comparable segment” of Pioneer Girl is “only six 
and a half pages long.” In this “product of . . . Wilder and Lane’s imaginations” (Fell-
man 85), Laura feels shocked when her sister Mary tells her that she knows why Laura 
used to want to slap her and that she thinks she deserved being slapped (12), and she 
feels bad about reading a poem in a fine book that she finds in a drawer because she 
realizes that her mother wanted that book to be a surprise gift for her (140).
Similarly, in These Happy Golden Years, older Laura is “furiously angry” at her 
student, Clarence, and trying to conceal her anger, for “as her eyes met his she knew 
that he expected her to be angry” (49). When going for a ride with Almanzo and her 
potential rival, Nellie, Laura is thinking that her acquaintance, Mr. Boast, knows that 
she intends to take Nellie down a road that she won’t like: “His eyes laughed at Laura. 
She was sure he guessed what was on her mind” (176). Later on, Laura is having a 
similar exchange of glances with Almanzo: “she let her eyes twinkle at him. She didn’t 
care if he did know that she had frightened the colts to scare Nellie, on purpose” (184; 
my emphases throughout).
This is very different from the inaugural volume, which focuses on how things are 
made as opposed to what people think and feel. Still, because the Little House books 
are treated as one continuous narrative—a story of Laura’s “transition from a tomboy-
ish girl to a marriageable woman” (Fellman 127)—it’s possible that the sociocognitive 
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complexity of the later volumes colors our perception of the first. Had those later 
volumes been constructed similarly to Little House in the Big Woods—that is, had they 
focused on objects and processes to the exclusion of complex social dynamics—per-
haps the Little House in the Big Woods wouldn’t have been considered a novel today. 
Instead, it might have been viewed as an arresting description of a child’s experience 
on the frontier—for, remember that expository nonfiction does very well with lower 
(i.e., first and second) levels of embedment!—perhaps something along the lines of 
Susan Sinnott’s Welcome to Kirsten’s World, 1854: Growing Up in Pioneer America.
To see how the perception of the Little House books as one continuous narrative 
has become entrenched in American popular culture, we can inquire into the role of 
the 1974–1983 television series, which didn’t follow the original’s division into vol-
umes (indeed, didn’t follow the original at all). I prefer, however, to look at another, 
subtler factor, one that has to do with Little House’s career as a mainstay of basal read-
ers used by US elementary school teachers from the 1930s until the 1990s. The origi-
nal inclusion in basal readers owed to the fact that Wilder’s book seemed to fit several 
diverse criteria articulated by 1920 research studies, which called for more “adventure 
stories (boys) and home-and-school stories (girls)” as well as for more “informational 
books.” The criteria changed by the 1970s—with stress on the emotional security pro-
vided by family and on the child’s ability “to master environment without adult help” 
(Fellman 123, 127–28). Once again, Little House books met those criteria because 
they have long been perceived—and taught!—as a story of Laura’s personal journey 
toward maturity and independence, made possible by her warm, supportive family.
So here we have Tom Sawyer classed with “kiddie lit” even as the frequency of its 
complex embedments makes it stand out among other books in its designated cohort, 
and Little House in the Big Woods considered a novel in the absence of any complex 
embedments. What these two outliers tell us is that, while sensitivity to patterns of 
embedded mental states offers literary scholars a useful starting point, to become an 
effective critical tool it has to be combined with historicist analysis. A critical inquiry 
into embedded mental states thus emerges as not just a cognitive but also a historicist 
project.
Age 3–7
3–7 is an extremely interesting age when it comes to embedment, because this is when 
children are more consistently found to be aware of first- and second-order false be-
liefs in themselves and others. Although the boundary between books for seven-year 
olds and nine-year olds is porous, here is one intriguing pattern found in stories sign-
posted specifically for the younger age group.
Some books marked for ages 3–7 contain just one third-level embedment, al-
though it can be repeated several times either with different characters or in slightly 
different settings. This embedment is central to the story, constituting, in effect, its 
punch line, its raison d’être. It’s typically structured as a dawning awareness, on the 
part of young readers, that they know something about one character’s thoughts that 
another character doesn’t know. (Literary scholars may recognize this as a preschool 
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version of dramatic irony,29 and thus talk of cultural scaffolding involved in shaping 
children into future mature readers, while developmental psychologists may note its 
similarity to their made-up scenarios used in double-embedment false-belief tests 
with six-year olds.)
Thus Jon Klassen’s This Is Not My Hat follows the path of a small fish who has sto-
len a big fish’s hat. Young readers gradually realize—and presumably delight in their 
realization30—that the small fish erroneously believes that the big fish doesn’t know 
who has stolen its hat. Julia Donaldson’s Gruffalo tells a story of a big scary monster 
who believes a mouse’s claims that she’s the most powerful animal in the forest. Once 
more, preschoolers are “in” on the joke: they know that the Gruffalo doesn’t realize 
that when he’s walking behind the mouse in the forest, other animals are scattering 
because they’re afraid of him and not of the tiny mouse.31
Similarly, reading Pat Hutchins’s Rosie’s Walk, children know that Rosie the hen 
doesn’t know that the hungry fox wants to devour her, and that she has one lucky es-
cape after another. In Gene Zion’s Harry the Dirty Dog, the premise of the story is that 
Harry’s owners don’t recognize Harry, a white dog with black spots, because running 
around the city and getting dirty has turned him into a black dog with white spots. 
The young readers thus know that Harry’s owners don’t suspect that the reason this 
strange dog brings them a scrubbing brush (a hateful implement, which Harry earlier 
buried in the backyard) is that he thinks that, once they wash him, they’ll recognize 
him as their beloved pet.
The positive affect presumably elicited in young readers by such embedments is a 
fascinating phenomenon. One may argue that it derives from identification with the 
characters,32 particularly those who get to have their way, such as Rosie, Harry, the big 
fish, and the little mouse. I tend to think that it comes from the perception of social 
mastery fostered by the plot. The child knows—and she knows that she knows!—that 
the small fish doesn’t realize that the big fish has already figured out who has stolen 
its hat and is on the way to catch the thief. So the big fish may end up eating the little 
fish, but it’s the young reader who is having a satisfying experience of being on top of 
the epistemological food chain.33
We may do well to remember here that contemporary writers for young children 
didn’t invent the concept of a triply-embedded punch line, and that it has been long 
present in “trickster” stories worldwide. Thus the premise of Gruffalo is based on a 
classic Chinese tale of a tiger and a fox. (The fox wants the tiger to think that, when 
they walk together, the fox slightly ahead, other animals run away because they are 
afraid of the fox.) We find triply-embedded mental states in West African folklore 
(e.g., Brer Rabbit wants Brer Fox to think that he’s afraid of the briar patch); in Na-
tive American legends (e.g., Badger knows that Coyote thinks that Badger is lying 
to him when he says that there is no food in the sack that the Badger is carrying on 
its back); in Bornean folktales (e.g. a mouse-deer wants a crocodile to think that the 
mouse-deer doesn’t know if the body in the water is the crocodile or just a log); and 
in Russian fairy tales (e.g. an exhausted old house cat wanders into the forest, where 
he meets a fox who promptly offers to marry him. Once married, the fox has to figure 
out how to protect and feed her new husband. She decides to make a bear and a wolf 
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think that the cat is an important government official who’ll be angry at them if they 
come to see him without substantial gifts).
Of course, not all trickster tales feature triply-embedded mental states. Just so, 
not all are geared toward children. Still if we only consider those that do and are, it 
is an extremely suggestive sociocognitive phenomenon. It seems that many cultural 
traditions offer young children stories featuring doubly-embedded false beliefs just at 
the time when children go through a developmental stage that makes them particu-
larly attuned to such beliefs. In this particular case, the “cultural” and the “cognitive” 
appear to form a feedback loop, shaping and reinforcing each other.
Age 1–2
Recall that in the study of children’s books by Dyer et al. (which found that books for 
younger and older children are similar in their “richness of mental state concepts”), 
the youngest subjects were three years old. I wonder if, at three, children are already 
too far advanced on the developmental trajectory that leads to awareness of (first-de-
gree) false belief. For, that awareness is not achieved suddenly once the child turns 
four. It is being continuously built up, in conjunction with other “maturational fac-
tors,” such as language ability.34
This is why I believe it’s worth our while to take a closer look at books for tod-
dlers.35 (This age group, as you remember, is now a subject of controversy: it used to be 
assumed that they have not yet reached the theory-of-mind milestone of appreciating 
false beliefs, but now experimental evidence suggests that one may elicit such appre-
ciation from them.) What I found after a preliminary study of books in this group, 
is that they do demonstrate a significant drop in third-level embedment. This is not 
to say that they don’t contain references, both explicit and implied, to mental states: 
They do. (This is a key difference between my approach and that of developmental 
psychologists studying children’s theory of mind: they look at mental states, I look 
at embedded mental states.) What they don’t seem to contain—at least those that 
don’t function as crossovers which appeal both to toddlers and to older readers—is 
third-level embedment.
In looking at books geared toward children aged 1–2, I focus on those which 
lay a claim to telling a story, as distinct, that is, from books of colors, numbers, body 
parts, etc., which don’t.36 There is, for instance, Curious George at the Zoo, A Touch 
and Feel Book. (Not to be confused with the original Margret and H. A. Rey’s “Curi-
ous George” stories and their more recent versions: The touch and feel books do not 
reproduce any of their plots. Indeed, the only thing they seem have in common with 
the “real” Curious George series are the two main characters.)
We learn on the first page that, the “man with the yellow hat is taking George 
to the Zoo today. There are so many things to see and do and touch.” Most of the 
pages that follow focus on the sensory: “Feel the black and white penguin’s thick coat,” 
“Feel the smooth shiny water,” “Feel the rhino’s rough skin.” The book does contain 
references to mental states (e.g., “Where has George gone? He would love to watch the 
pink flamingo standing on one leg”), but it has no complex embedments.
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Note that Curious George currently has 175 reviews on amazon.com, and 62 of 
them mention explicitly the age of the young reader (another 10 merely say that the 
reader is a “toddler”). Out of these 62, 58 cluster between the ages of 4 and 24 months. 
While we may not want to put too much emphasis on this bit of digital data mining, 
it offers a useful glimpse at the perspective of caregivers who actually buy these books 
and judge their appropriateness for their young charges.
Here is another example: Disney’s Pooh’s Honey Trouble, based, loosely, on the 
first chapter of Milne’s Winnie the Pooh. That’s the chapter in which Pooh hopes to fool 
the bees into thinking that he is a black cloud and not a honey-stealing bear floating 
on a balloon, and in which Christopher Robin doesn’t want to hurt Pooh’s feelings by 
telling him that his plan won’t work. In Disney’s version, Pooh wakes up in the morn-
ing feeling hungry and goes out in search of honey. He comes across several of his 
friends, busy doing what they like to do. Then Christopher Robin finds out that Pooh 
is hungry and gives him a balloon, with which he finally manages to get some honey:
Winnie the Pooh awoke one morning with rumbly in his tumbly. ‘Oh, both-
er,’ he said, finding his honeypots not at all full. The trouble with empty 
honeypots, thought Pooh, is that they’re so very empty. Pooh went to see 
Piglet who was busy gathering haycorns. Pooh helped his friend for a bit, but 
picking haycorns didn’t help to take his mind off his rumbly tummy, so he 
continued on. . . . ‘Hello, Pooh Boy!’ said Tigger, bouncing his way through 
the forest. ‘Tiggers love bouncing.’ ‘And bears love honey,’ Pooh replied in a 
rumbly voice. . . . When Christopher Robin heard of Pooh’s honey trouble, 
he gave him a balloon. The balloon was very nice, in a balloonish sort of 
way, but Pooh was quite sure it wouldn’t make his tummy any less rumbly. 
‘Silly old bear,’ said Christopher Robin, watching Pooh float up, up, up, up 
to the spot where the honey was. And, at last, Pooh’s tummy wasn’t rumbly 
anymore.’ (n.p.)
What kind of embedments do we have here? Most of them are first level, such 
as “Pooh wants honey,” “Tiggers love bouncing,” “Rabbits like carrots,” “Piglet likes 
haycorns,” although there are also some implied second-level ones, such as “Pooh 
knows that Piglet likes haycorns,” or “Christopher Robin knows that Pooh doesn’t 
understand what the balloon is for.”
There are currently 72 reviews of this book available,37 and 29 of them explicitly 
mention the age of the child for whom the book was bought. Out of these 29, 28 fall 
between the ages of 8 and 24 months, making it, as one reviewer puts it emphatically, 
a “book for toddlers” (“Laura Link,” September 2015).
The development of theory of mind is intertwined with the acquisition of vocab-
ulary, but it’s not its simple vocabulary that makes Pooh’s Honey Trouble “a book for 
toddlers.” Take another look at Rosie’s Walk (from the section “Age 3–7”). Rosie’s Walk 
contains fewer words that either Curious George at the Zoo or Pooh’s Honey Trou-
ble, and, unlike them, it has no explicit references to mental states.38 Nevertheless it 
does embed mental states on the third level—via illustrations!—and the reviews on 
20  Lisa Zunshine
amazon.com testify to its popularity with parents of preschoolers, with kindergarten 
teachers, and with beginner readers themselves.39
Still, although I am encouraged by early findings about the relative scarcity of 
third-level embedments in books for 1–2 year olds, I would be cautious about simply 
concluding that they signal intuitive awareness on the part of authors and caregivers of 
the stages in the development of theory of mind. For, the excision of complex mental 
states from such books must also have its own history, bound up with the emergence 
of what Alan Richardson calls “the children’s book industry,” which in England, for 
instance, goes back to at least 1744.40 Elsewhere, I have looked at an eighteenth-cen-
tury text specifically geared toward three-to-five year olds, Anna Laetitia Barbauld’s 
Hymns in Prose for Children (1781),41 but I don’t want to conclude too much based on 
just one case study.
Complicating the issue even further are the recent experiments of cognitive sci-
entists which demonstrate some awareness of false beliefs in 15-month-olds. Given 
these experiments, one would think that it may be good for a one-year old, now and 
then, to hear a story that is “above her head”—that is, a story that embeds mental 
states on the third level—especially if her parents make a point of talking with her 
about the characters’ thoughts and feelings. Benefits of this practice are borne out by 
research of developmental psychologist Paul L. Harris and his colleagues, who have 
shown that parents “who talk about psychological themes promote their children’s 
mental state understanding,” especially, when their elucidation of mental states “is 
not tied to particular lexical terms or syntactic constructions . . . [reflecting, instead] a 
wide-ranging sensitivity to individual perspectives and [nurturing] the same sensitiv-
ity in children” (71–72).42 Of course, to extrapolate from Peskin and Astington’s study, 
there may be a delicate balance between letting a toddler infer implied mental states 
of characters in a children’s book and talking to her about those mental states. This, 
moreover, is the point at which our current state of knowledge makes me cautious 
about speculating any further, calling (predictably) for more research into historical 
and cognitive-developmental aspects of embedment in stories for toddlers.
Crossovers
It’s fitting to conclude this section with a discussion of crossovers,43 books that appeal 
to toddlers and to their parents, such as Marla Frazee’s Hush, Little Baby. The “story” 
told by this board book is an old folksong, “Hush little baby, don’t say a word,” tran-
scribed verbatim. There are no third-level embedments in the song. In fact, there are 
no references to mental states at all, although we may come up with a couple of im-
plied embedments, such as, papa and mama are willing to buy anything to make their 
baby happy (“If that billy goat don’t pull, / Papa’s gonna buy you a cart and a bull”), 
and papa and mama love the baby (“If that horse and cart fall down, / You’ll still be the 
sweetest little baby in town”).
Frazee’s illustrations, however, tell a different story. Its protagonist is an older sis-
ter, who is about eight and jealous of the attention that the new baby gets. So when the 
baby’s peacefully asleep and the parents are looking the other way, the girl pushes the 
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cradle roughly. The baby wakes up screaming, and the girl pretends to be concerned 
and eager to calm it down (“Hush, little baby, don’t say a word”), while the startled 
and bleary-eyed parents look on. The girl then convinces the father that they should 
go visit a village peddler, because a mockingbird in a cage would surely console the 
baby. Frazee’s drawings seem to imply that the girl has wanted the bird for some time 
and that she is thrilled to get some time alone with her daddy. And so it goes. The baby 
keeps crying, while the older sister keeps accumulating one treasure after another 
(a diamond ring, a looking glass, a puppy), delighted by her important role in the 
common project of calming down the baby, and in fact, gradually warming up to the 
little interloper.
There are numerous third-level embedments in the story told by the pictures. At 
first, we are encouraged to think that the parents don’t suspect that the girl is jealous, 
just as they don’t suspect that she only wants them to think that these toys are for the 
baby while, in reality, they are for her. But toward the end of the narrative we begin to 
wonder if the parents are indeed as clueless as the girl thinks they are. In fact, when 
she gets the puppy, the father’s facial expression seems to imply that he has under-
stood all along more than his daughter thought he did. His glance breaks the fourth 
wall and draws us in: He wants us to know that he knows what’s going on. (Or, given 
that the narrative thus foregrounds the relationship between the implied reader and 
the implied author, another way to map out this scene would be to say that Frazee 
wants us to know that the father knows what’s going on.)
Lipson (48) as well as amazon.com44 put the age of the reader for Hush, Little 
Baby at two-three years old, which is reasonable, given that the original folksong has 
no third-level embedments. Freeman (236), Gillespie (712), and scholastic.com,45 
however, estimate the age of the reader as PreK–2. The difference between two-three 
and PreK–2 appears striking unless we assume that Freeman, Gillespie, and scholas-
tic.com respond to the story told by the book’s illustrations. The level of embedment 
in that story, indeed, makes it appropriate for readers who can appreciate the first- and 
Figure 1. “If that dog named Rover don’t bark.” Franzee, Marla. Hush, Little Baby: A Folk Song with Pictures Board Book.
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even second-order false beliefs, that is, for four to seven year olds. Moreover, respons-
es accumulated on amazon.com show that parents and grandparents are intuitively 
aware that Frazee’s book contains two stories under one cover, one geared (we can 
say) toward a more mature theory of mind, and another, toward a theory of mind 
early-in-development.”46
What I have hoped to show throughout my essay is that embedded mental states 
are richly present not just in “grownup” fiction but also in children’s literature, and 
that a critical inquiry into patterns of embedment in children’s literature draws on 
close reading, cultural-historicist analysis, research in cognitive science, and even 
some occasional digital data mining. As such it makes a practitioner of the cognitive 
approach to literary criticism accountable to several different fields and, moreover, 
aware of the provisional state of her conclusions. This may imply more uncertainty 
than our discipline is used to, but, then, one doesn’t turn to interdisciplinary work 
seeking certainty and familiarity.
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